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WARNER BROS. V. NELSON: A PRELUDE TO THE 
DE HAVILLAND LAW 
John M. Broderick* 
In 1944, the California Court of Appeals handed down its landmark 
decision in De Haviland v. Warner Bros ending the practice of studios ex-
tending personal service contracts beyond the statutory limit of seven years 
by adding suspension periods incurred during the contract term.  “Suspen-
sion/extension” could double the term of an actor’s contract.  The De 
Haviland case has justly received much attention, but an earlier case, Warner 
Bros. v. Nelson, in which Bette Davis also challenged the practice of suspen-
sion/extension, merits more attention than it has received. 
In Warner Bros. Nelson, Davis argued that her studio contract should 
not be enforced on several grounds including that the suspension/extension 
clauses were inequitable.  During the trial, the studio waived its powerful 
rights to suspension/extension for reasons previously unknown.  Not until 
now has that waiver been properly contextualized with the help of archival 
research of studio records.  Furthermore, archival research has uncovered 
that the studio explored revising and limiting its power of suspension/exten-
sion as a result of Davis’s arguments.   
This Article reveals that Davis achieved much more than was previ-
ously understood.  It discusses how these cases, in particular De Haviland, 
still resonate today in the sports and entertainment industries.  It also sug-
gests that the recent dispute between the Writers Guild of America and the 
Association of Talent Agents can be viewed as a consequence of these cases. 
                                                          
*J.D. 1998 University of Illinois College of Law, M.F.A. 2013 University of Southern California 
School of Cinematic Arts.  The author wishes to thank Dr. Richard Jewell, Professor Emeritus of 
Cinema and Media Studies, University of Southern California School of Cinematic Arts for his 
encouragement to seek publication of this article.  He would also like to thank his wife Shaunagh 
for her support and the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review editorial board and staff 
for their assistance and feedback. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Hollywood’s classic studio era,1 stars were held under the thumb of 
the major studios with oppressive, long-term personal service contracts.2  
Studios often extended actors’ contractual periods of personal service by 
adding the duration of any suspensions incurred by the actors to the original 
contract period.3  In practice, suspension/extension could result in the dou-
bling of an actor’s contractual period of personal service,4 and could extend 
the period far past California’s statutory time limit of seven years.5  Some 
stars rebelled against studio control, including one of Warner Bros. Pictures, 
Inc.’s (“Warner Bros.”) biggest stars, Academy Award winner Bette Davis.6   
Davis’s clashes with Warner Bros. over being paid less than male ac-
tors, artistic autonomy, and the practice of suspension/extension ultimately 
led them to a London courtroom in October 1936 in Warner Bros. Pictures, 
Incorporated v. Nelson (“Nelson”).7  Although Davis lost her case, eight 
years later in 1944, the Second District of the California Court of Appeal put 
an end to the practice of extending personal service contracts beyond the 
seven-year statutory limit in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. (“De Haviland”).8  
                                                          
1. The classic studio era has been defined as the years between 1929 and 1945.  See 
RICHARD B. JEWELL, THE GOLDEN AGE OF CINEMA 1 (2007); compare with DOUGLAS GOMERY, 
THE HOLLYWOOD STUDIO SYSTEM: A HISTORY 71 (2005) (defining classic studio era as the years 
between 1931 and 1951). 
2. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255.  As a category, personal service contracts “include[] 
nearly all master/servant continuous employment agreements.”  Jonathan Blaufarb, The Seven-Year 
Itch: California Labor Code Section 2855, 6 HASTINGS COMM & ENT L.J. 653, 657 (1983). 
3. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255.  Hereinafter, this practice is referred to as “suspension
/extension.”  The standard personal service contract used by the studios included suspension/exten-
sion clauses.  See infra notes 43–44.   
4. See infra note 47. 
5. In 1931, the statutory time limit for personal service contracts was expanded from five 
to seven years.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1980 (West 2020); see Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 n.19 
(discussing the legislative history of the adoption of a seven-year period). 
6. See, e.g., infra notes 150, 183, and 222.  
7. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209.  Davis was married to musician 
Harmon O. “Ham” Nelson, Jr. in 1936.  See ED SIKOV, DARK VICTORY: THE LIFE OF BETTE DAVIS 
90 (2007). 
8. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944).  
The case caption is published in the official case reports with Olivia de Havilland’s name mis-
spelled as “De Haviland.”  See Robert Steinberg, Injunctions-Unjust Restraint on Entertainers in 
BRODERICK_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2021  11:25 PM 
2021] WARNER BROS. V. NELSON 113 
The resulting decision became known as “the De Havilland Law.”9  Today, 
the De Havilland Law remains relevant in labor relations in the entertainment 
industry and sports, and its consequences resonate in the current dispute be-
tween the Writers Guild of America and the Association of Talent Agents 
member agencies.10 
This Article examines Nelson11 with the aid of archival research and 
demonstrates that, although Davis did not prevail, her case concretely fore-
shadowed the De Havilland Law.  The history of the De Havilland Law is 
usually told in the following way: Olivia de Havilland won, whereas Bette 
Davis lost.  But archival research shows that in spite of Davis’s loss, her case 
compelled Warner Bros. to make two unexpected decisions: (1) to waive the 
studio’s right to extend Davis’s contract past the seven-year limit in the Nel-
son case and (2) to examine their standard contracts with an eye toward re-
stricting the practice of suspension/extension.12   
Part II of this Article describes the era in which Nelson and De 
Haviland took place, including how the standard studio contract played a 
part in the star system in the classic studio era.  Part III examines Nelson,13 
in which Warner Bros. filed an injunction against Davis to prevent her from 
starring in a film for another production company.  Part III also addresses 
research from the Warner Bros. archives which shows how Davis’s case 
came very close to forcing a change in the standard personal service contract 
used by Warner Bros.  Part IV discusses the case that Nelson14 
                                                          
California, 1 LOY. ENT. L.J. 91, 106 n.83 (1981).  When referring to Olivia de Havilland herself, 
her name will be spelled correctly.  When referring to the case caption, her name will be spelled 
consistent with the spelling in the official case caption. 
9. See, e.g., HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW 210 (Paul McDonald et al. eds., 2015) (describing 
De Haviland v. Warner Bros. as the seminal case that interpreted § 2855 and came to be known as 
the “De Havilland Law” in legal parlance); Russell Fowler, Three Women Take on the Hollywood 
Studio System, 55 TENN. BAR J. 27, 28 (2019) (referring to de Havilland’s precedent-setting case 
as “the De Havilland Law”). 
10. See infra Part V. 
11. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209. 
12. See infra Part III Section F. 
13. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209. 
14. Id. 
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foreshadowed, De Haviland v. Warner Bros.,15 which ended the practice of 
extending personal service contracts past seven years.  Part V explores the 
significance and relevance of the Nelson and De Haviland cases, and how 
the aftershocks from these related cases were felt in postwar Hollywood16 
and continue to be felt today.  In the words of Bette Davis’s Margo Channing 
in All About Eve, “Fasten your seatbelts, it’s going to be a bumpy night.”17 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section contextualizes the legal disputes in Nelson and De Havil-
land.  First, it describes how the classic studio era was organized.  Next, it 
addresses how the star system worked in the classical studio era.  And lastly, 
it discusses how the studios used standard long-term personal service con-
tracts with their stars. 
A. Corporate Organization of the Classic Studio Era 
The classic studio era was ruled by a small set of companies.18  Eight 
studios collected ninety-five percent of film industry revenues: Paramount, 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”),19 Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation 
(“RKO”), Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, Warner Bros., Inc., Co-
lumbia Pictures Corporation, Universal Corporation, and United Artists Cor-
poration.20  These eight studios were known as “the majors.”21  Through col-
lusion and other monopolistic practices, the majors kept control of the 
industry and kept out, for the most part, other potential players.22  Five of the 
                                                          
15. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985–86 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944). 
16. See DREW CASPER, POSTWAR HOLLYWOOD 1946-1962 1 (2007). 
17. ALL ABOUT EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1950). 
18. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 79 (“Eight major corporations . . . dominated all phases 
of industry operation.”). 
19. MGM was owned by Loew’s, Inc.  See id. at 99. 
20. See id. at 79. 
21. Id. at 1. 
22. See id. at 79 (identifying Republic, Monogram, and Disney as small, marginal compa-
nies that were tolerated by the majors).   
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majors— Paramount, MGM, RKO, Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., and 
Warner Bros.— produced, distributed, and exhibited their own motion pic-
tures.23  These five studios were known as the Big Five.24  The majors con-
trolled most theaters in the United States and were able to deny outsiders 
access to theatrical exhibition in desirable venues.25   
B. The Star System 
The star system was a critical component to the success of the film 
business during the classic studio era.26  “Stars” can be defined as “actors 
who became intense objects of public fascination.”27  The star system in-
cluded the way studios cultivated actors into stars, marketed their stars, and 
in turn, marketed their films to exhibitors.28  The stars cast in a particular 
film signaled to both exhibitors and audiences what kind of picture to ex-
pect.29  Studios cast their stars in multiple films each year in different genres, 
and audiences could pick the type of film in which to see their favorite ac-
tor.30  Furthermore, instead of being screened to exhibitors beforehand, films 
were marketed based on “star power.”31 
Star development represented a significant investment for the studios.32  
This investment included a range of lessons and training such as acting 
                                                          
23. See Brandon Drea, Antitrust Conflict in Hollywood, 9 ARIZ. STATE SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
98, 108 (2020).   
24. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 71. 
25. See id. at 79. 
26. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 250.  Even after the U.S. Supreme Court broke up the 
majors in U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948), stars were an important factor in the 
newly formed companies.  See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 94. 
27. JEWELL, supra note 1, at 250. 
28. See id. at 251; GOMERY, supra note 1, at 7 (attributing the creation of the business 
strategy known as the star system to Adolph Zukor, which was copied by all studios). 
29. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 251. 
30. See id. at 256–57. 
31. Id. at 251. 
32. See id. at 258. 
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lessons, voice training, grooming advice, and physical fitness coaching.33  To 
protect their investments, the studios kept their actors under long-term em-
ployment contracts.34 
C. Use of Long-Term Personal Service Contracts During the 
Classic Studio Era 
The long-term personal service contract was crucial to the star sys-
tem.35  Personal service contracts during this era were usually for five or 
seven-year terms,36  but that limitation only applied to the stars.  A studio 
bound by such a contract was committed to a given actor for only a six-month 
term because these contracts commonly contained a six-month option clause 
for the studio to exercise or not.37  Clearly, the contracts gave studios most 
of the power in these relationships.38  For instance, the studio could deter-
mine when vacation periods began and ended, and it had the right to loan its 
                                                          
33. See id. 
34. See id. at 255. 
35. See id. at 255.  Personal service contracts create a “master/servant” relationship.  Artists 
are not typically classified as servants, but “they will be so defined as long as the promised perfor-
mance is of a personal and non-delegable character.”  “Duties are nondelegable if pertaining to a 
contract based on artistic skill or unique abilities.”  One reason that an employment contract defines 
the services provided by an employee as being “of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual 
character” is to establish that the services are nondelegable.  Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657.   
36. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255.  The term for personal service contracts was limited 
by statute to two years until 1919.  In 1919, the term was expanded to five years, and in 1931, the 
term was expanded to seven years.  See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656.  The expansion to seven 
years did not sit well with the acting community: “[n]ew California law allowing seven year con-
tracts is not looked on favorably by talent, who see it only as an advantage to the producer.”  Ob-
jections to 7-Yr. Contract, VARIETY, June 30, 1931, at 3. 
37. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255; Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and 
Bette Davis, 15–16 (Dec. 29, 1934) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of South-
ern California). 
38. See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 659 (explaining how entertainment industry contracts 
“are written in options, rather for a flat term, in order to allow the employer an advantageous degree 
of flexibility in determining the duration of the employment relationship.”).  For the star, a long-
term contract could offer a degree of security, but this benefit was in tension with the potential 
detriment the star may experience when her worth rises dramatically during the contract term, 
which was the case with Davis and de Havilland.  See id. at 658. 
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actors to other studios (called “loan-outs”).39  In addition, the studio had full 
control over the star’s acting assignments.40 
A standard studio contract included several clauses central to the Nel-
son and De Haviland cases.  The first such clause defined the services pro-
vided by the star as being “of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual 
character[] . . . .”41 The second important clause required the star to render 
their services exclusively for the studio.42  Third, the standard contract gave 
the studio the right to suspend the star for a variety of reasons if the star could 
not, or refused, to work.43  Fourth, the contract allowed the studio to extend 
the duration of the contract by the length of time of each suspension.44 
The last two clauses—the right to suspend and the right to extend—
embodied the practice of suspension/extension in the standard studio con-
tract.45  The time an actor was placed on suspension was automatically added 
                                                          
39. A “loan out” occurs when a studio gives another producer or studio the temporary right 
to use one of the lending studio’s stars in one of the borrower’s films.  See JEWELL, supra note 1, 
at 255.  The standard personal service contract gave a studio the right to loan out its contract actors 
to other studios. 
40. But see JEWELL, supra note 1, at 257 (noting that, at times, stars successfully negotiated 
for the right to refuse an acting assignment).  The way in which an actor broke into the business 
could dictate their negotiating posture with the studio.  For example, Edward G. Robinson per-
formed in LITTLE CAESAR (Warner Bros. 1931) without a long-term contract, and that film’s suc-
cess gave him considerable negotiating leverage with the studio.  See THOMAS SCHATZ, A 
TRIUMPH OF BITCHERY: WARNER BROS., BETTE DAVIS AND JEZEBEL, IN THE STUDIO SYSTEM 77 
(Janet Staiger ed., 1995).   
41. Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 
11.  The main reason for adding a “unique and extraordinary services” clause is to provide evidence 
for a claim of injunctive relief.  See infra Section III (C)(1).  
42. Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 5 
(“The Artist agrees that she will, during the term hereof, render such services solely and exclusively 
to and for the Producer, and that she will not, during such time, render any service for or in any 
other . . . motion picture production . . . .”). 
43. See, e.g., id., at 8, 12 (if a star could not perform for medical reasons or did not perform 
due to failure, refusal or neglect).   
44. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 
12.  Suspension/extension clauses demonstrate the studios’ superior bargaining power.  See 
Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 665 (explaining that suspension/extension benefits the employer by “in-
suring receipt of the contracted-for period of service at the employee’s current level of compensa-
tion”); SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81 (describing the function of suspension/extension clauses as 
preventing stars “from waiting out their contracts and becoming ‘free agents’”).   
45. See Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 664. 
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to the original duration of the contract,46 a practice that could double the 
length of the contract.47  Although standard studio contracts were burden-
some, stars risked being blacklisted—for example, by other studios refusing 
to hire such stars—if they openly challenged the studios, such as by filing a 
lawsuit.48 
III. WARNER BROS. V. NELSON 
This section examines Nelson and looks behind the scenes at Warner 
Bros.’s actions with respect to their standard personal service contract after 
the case ended.  Section III.A reviews some of the particular issues and 
events that led up to Warner Bros. seeking injunctive relief against Bette 
Davis.  Section III.B analyzes why damages were inadequate in this type of 
dispute between a star and her studio.  Section III.C examines the nature of 
injunctive relief available in California where the contract was made between 
the parties, and under English law, the law of the case’s venue.  Section III.D 
outlines Davis’s legal strategy.  Section III.E reviews the outcome of the case 
and the court’s decision.  Finally, Section III.F demonstrates, with trial rec-
ords and internal documents, how the practice of suspension/extension came 
under scrutiny by the court, and how the Warner Bros. legal team reacted to 
that scrutiny. 
A. Background of the Dispute Between the Star and the Studio 
Bette Davis has been described as “the most unusual of movie stars.”49  
Her stardom was surprising because of her willingness to play unsympathetic 
                                                          
46. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 255. 
47. See, e.g., DAVID NIVEN, BRING ON THE EMPTY HORSES 20 (1976) (“Some of us gave 
twelve or fourteen sulfurous years of our short actor’s lives working off a seven-year contract”); 
VICTORIA AMADOR, OLIVIA DE HAVILLAND LADY TRIUMPHANT 141–42, 146 (1st ed. 2019) (de-
scribing how actors were known to have their period of personal service extended up to twelve or 
fifteen years because of the practice of suspension/extension).   
48. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Olivia de Havilland: The Actress Who Took on the Studio 
System and Won, L.A. TIMES, (July 1, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-stipanowich-de-havilland—20160701-snap-story.html [http://archive.today/8Ojuu]; AMADOR, 
supra note 47, at 143 (describing efforts by Warner Bros. to prevent de Havilland from being hired 
by other studios and delaying the release of her latest film). 
49. JEWELL, supra note 1, at 268; JAMES SPADA, MORE THAN A WOMAN: AN INTIMATE 
BIOGRAPHY OF BETTE DAVIS 1036–37 (1993) (Bette Davis was described by Angela Lansbury at 
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roles, such as the morally corrupt Mildred in Of Human Bondage50 and vil-
lainesses in other films.51  She won two Oscars for best actress and at one 
time held the record for most nominations at ten.52   
In 1931, Warner Bros. signed Bette Davis to a standard contract for the 
first time.53  Warner Bros. began as a family-owned business in 1923.54  In 
the 1930s, the three brothers: Harry, Abe, and Jack L. Warner led different 
parts of the company.55  Jack Warner, the youngest, was the head of the stu-
dio in Burbank, California.56  While the other major studios made efforts to 
remain on good terms with their stars, Warner Bros. earned a reputation for 
being the most contentious of studios because of its many conflicts with its 
stars.57   
In 1936, a few months before the dispute over her contract erupted, 
Davis won her first Oscar for Best Actress for her performance in Danger-
ous.58  Because of the recognition she gained from Of Human Bondage and 
                                                          
Davis’s memorial service as a master of the craft “who should serve as an example to future gen-
erations of actors”). 
50. See generally OF HUMAN BONDAGE (Warner Bros. 1934). 
51. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 268.   
52. See Academy Awards Database, ACAD. MOTION PICTURES ARTS SCIS., https://
www.oscars.org/oscars/awards-databases-0 [https://perma.cc/BEH8-ERNF].   
53.  See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 44.  Davis agreed to a new contract with Warner Bros. in 
1934.  Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 1.  A good 
argument can be made that under § 2855, seven years should be counted from the original contract 
in 1931 rather than from the contract executed in 1934 because:  (1) she likely negotiated her new 
agreement as an employee still obligated under an existing contract (and such an employee is not 
in a position to negotiate for the highest possible compensation) and (2) she was not able to test her 
value in the entire marketplace during an “open-market break” between contracts.  See Blaufarb, 
supra note 2, at 682 (setting forth the argument that without an “open-market break,” the new 
agreement “cannot be viewed as a truly ‘new’ contract” for purposes of § 2855). 
54. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 46. 
55. See id. at 130.  Sam Warner, the fourth brother who co-founded the studio, died in 
October of 1927.  Id. at 51. 
56. Id. 
57. See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 257; SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 77 (noting that Davis’s 
lawsuit was one of many between Warner Bros. and its stars in the 1930’s). 
58. DANGEROUS (Warner Bros. 1935); see JEWELL, supra note 1, at 267. 
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her recent Academy Award, Davis wanted more substantial roles.59  During 
the summer of 1936, she refused to perform in the film God’s Country and 
the Woman and sought to renegotiate her contract with Warner Bros.60  The 
inequality in pay between her and male actors was an additional reason fuel-
ing her dispute with the studio.61  Davis complained to the press in March 
1936 about receiving a telegram request for her to return to the studio for 
retakes.62  Davis reportedly complained to the press that her studio bosses 
were a “headache,” which did not go unnoticed by those same bosses.63   
                                                          
59. See, e.g., BETTE DAVIS, THE LONELY LIFE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 147–48 (2017) 
(ebook).  Davis’s evolution as a star was a situation the statutory term limit in § 2855 was intended 
to address, see De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 988 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944); see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 653 (discussing public policy considerations for limiting 
the term of a personal service contract which include “circumstances will change over the course 
of the agreement” and an employee’s worth may increase “as a result of increased experience, 
talent, and skill”). 
60. Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein (Aug. 17, 1936) (on file with Warner 
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).  For a detailed account of Davis’s nego-
tiations with Warner Bros., see SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 78–81. 
61. See Alma Whitaker, Bette Davis Tells of Battle for Pay, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1936 at 
C1.  The archive also contains various summaries of the events leading up to the litigation.  See, 
e.g., Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Robert W. Perkins (Sept. 9, 1936) (on file with the Warner 
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
62. See Film Bosses ‘Headache’ to Bette Davis, EVENING J., Mar. 25, 1936, at 17 (on file 
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).  The term retake refers to a 
“second, third, tenth, or even hundredth attempt to film a given shot; the term retake sometimes 
implies that the shooting occurs on a day subsequent to the original takes; actors are often brought 
back to the studio at the end of production to shoot retakes of shots and scenes the director finds to 
be problematic for one reason or another.”  ED SIKOV, FILM STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION 223 (2d 
ed. 2020). 
63.  See Film Bosses ‘Headache’ to Bette Davis, EVENING J., Mar. 25, 1936, at 17 (on file 
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).  The “headache” comment 
was precipitated by Davis receiving a telegram from Warner Bros. upon her arrival in New York 
for a vacation, which required her to immediately return to Los Angeles for retakes.  Id.  The term 
“retake” refers to a “second, third, tenth, or even hundredth attempt to film a given shot; the term 
retake sometimes implies that the shooting occurs on a day subsequent to the original takes; actors 
are often brought back to the studio at the end of production to shoot retakes of shots and scenes 
the director finds to be problematic for one reason or another.”  ED SIKOV, FILM STUDIES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 223 (2d ed. 2020) (emphasis in original).  See also Telegram from Harry M. Warner 
to Hal Wallis (Aug. 10, 1936) (on file with the Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern 
California). 
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In a letter from one of her attorneys, Dudley R. Furse, Davis set forth 
ten terms as a basis for a new contract,64 which included the following de-
mands: a limit of four pictures per year; three months of vacation time; in-
creased pay; identification of acceptable cameramen; and a contract term of 
five years.65  Jack Warner responded that Warner Bros. would only agree to 
an increase in pay if the studio could retain all the other terms from the pre-
vious version of the contract.66 
Soon, Warner Bros. learned that Davis was traveling to England with 
the intention of appearing in a film for Toeplitz Productions Ltd. 
(“Toeplitz”).67  Roy Obringer, counsel for Warner Bros. in Los Angeles, ad-
vised Morris Ebenstein, counsel for Warner Bros. in New York, to have the 
studio’s English counsel notify Toeplitz that Davis was still under contract 
with Warner Bros.68  Ebenstein wrote back confirming he did this, and fur-
ther stated, “I believe this takes care of the situation.”69  However, the situa-
tion was not resolved as Davis still intended to appear in the film for 
Toeplitz.70  Davis arrived in the United Kingdom in mid-August of 1936, 
and was warmly welcomed by Ludovico Toeplitz himself in London shortly 
thereafter.71  Warner Bros. thus pursued an injunction against Davis in the 
London courts, initiating Warner Bros. v. Nelson.72   
                                                          
64. See Letter from Dudley R. Furse to Roy J. Obringer (June 19, 1936) (on file with the 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
65. Id. 
66. See Letter from Jack L. Warner to Bette Davis (June 24, 1936) (on file with the Warner 
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
67. See Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein; supra note 60; see SIKOV, supra 
note 7, at 90.   
68. See Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Morris Ebenstein; supra note 60. 
69. See Letter from Morris Ebenstein to Roy J. Obringer (Aug. 25, 1936) (on file with the 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
70. See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 90. 
71. See id. 
72. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209.  Davis was served with pro-
cess in her hotel room.  See SIKOV, supra note 7, at 90. 
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B. The Inadequacy of Damages 
When seeking injunctive relief, as Warner Bros. did in Warner Bros. v. 
Nelson,73 one must show damages are an inadequate remedy.74  This section 
takes a slight detour to examine why damages were inadequate in a situation 
where a star like Davis breached her contract.  Generally, the non-breaching 
party to a contract is compensated with an amount approximate to the bene-
fits the party would have received had the breaching party performed under 
the contract.75  Although many benefits are compensable, they must be 
“clearly ascertainable.”76  For example, lost profits or expenditures, such as 
overhead,77 are often sought as damages.78   
An instructive example of how damages were difficult to calculate 
when actors refused assignments can be drawn from the Warner Bros. legal 
file for the lawsuit between Warner Bros. and actor Olivia de Havilland that 
occurred eight years after Nelson.79  Olivia de Havilland, who was a friend 
of Davis,80 had great versatility as an actor.81  She appeared in a variety of 
films from a Shakespearean adaptation82 to horror.83  De Havilland is most 
well-known for her role in Gone With the Wind84 and the successful pairing 
                                                          
73. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 209. 
74. See, e.g., Elliott Axelrod, The Efficacy of the Negative Injunction in Breach of Enter-
tainment Contracts, 46 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 411 (2013); Steinberg, supra note 8, at 99 n.43.   
75. See 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 869 (11th ed. 2020). 
76. Id. § 879.   
77. “Overhead” for a studio included expenses not directly related to production, such as 
executives’ salaries, costs of studio real estate, security, insurance, maintenance and other miscel-
laneous items.  See JEWELL, supra note 1, at 69.   
78. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 879, 883, supra note 75. 
79. See infra Section D. 
80. See AMADOR, supra note 47, at 50. 
81. See id. at 148.   
82. See A MIDSUMMER’S NIGHT DREAM (Warner Bros. 1935). 
83. See HUSH HUSH SWEET CHARLOTTE (Twentieth Century Fox 1964). 
84. GONE WITH THE WIND (Selznick Int’l Pictures in association with Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer 1939); see Justin Chang, Appreciation: Olivia de Havilland Was Never to Be 
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of her with Errol Flynn in eight films.85  De Havilland received five Acad-
emy Award nominations and won twice—the same number of wins as Da-
vis.86   
In 1943, de Havilland sought a declaration that her contract had 
ended,87 and, in response, Warner Bros. looked closely at pursuing damages 
against her in a counterclaim.88  She was suspended multiple times and re-
placed on four films because she refused to perform several roles assigned 
by the studio.89  The studio examined its potential to recover lost profits on 
the films she refused to perform in, and whether the studio had incurred in-
creased production costs. 
One difficulty with awarding lost profits is the struggle to prove what 
“would” have occurred had the contract not been breached.  A claimant must 
show that the hypothetical profits are not the product of speculation.90  One 
measure of lost profits is past performance.91  In pursuit of their counterclaim 
against de Havilland, Warner Bros. compared the profits of her past films 
with the ones she refused.92  Internal program sheets were compiled listing 
                                                          
Underestimated in Life or Art, L.A. TIMES (July 26, 2020, 6:18 PM), https://www.latimes.com
/entertainment-arts/movies/story/2020-07-26/olivia-de-havilland-appreciation [https://perma.cc
/3HQM-3KUJ]. 
85. AMADOR, supra note 47, at 38.   
86. Id. at 13; see Academy Awards Database, supra note 52. 
87. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944). 
88. See Memorandum from Jack Warner to Roy J. Obringer (July 27, 1944) (on file with 
the University of Southern California, University Archives) (“Reference [de Havilland] along the 
lines we discussed today. Will you investigate the possibility of our bringing suit against her from 
the time she was in default.”); see also Letter from Roy J. Obringer to Charles Loring (Aug. 1, 
1944) (on file with the University of Southern California, University Archives) (“[Jack Warner] 
desires to be advised with respect to the possibility of seeking damages against Miss [de Havilland] 
. . .”) (sic).  
89. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 984. 
90. See, e.g., Fallis v. Julian Petroleum Co., 292 P. 168, 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930).   
91. See, e.g., Grupe v. Glick, 160 P.2d 832, 840 (Cal. 1945). 
92. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared (on file with Warner Bros. Ar-
chives at the University of Southern California); see also List of Pictures Rejected by Miss DeHa-
villand (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
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only her films.93  The lists showed the films she appeared in for Warner Bros. 
and identified her “loan-outs.”94  Warner Bros. saw a profit on all of her 
films.95  A second program sheet was compiled with the films she refused.96  
Each of the films she refused earned a profit.97  Based on the program sheets 
alone, it would have been difficult to demonstrate to a judge or jury that 
Warner Bros. lost profits on the films de Havilland refused. 
Warner Bros. also analyzed internally whether de Havilland’s actions 
caused an increase in production costs from the cost of replacing her on the 
pictures she refused.  The archive contains a document entitled “Picture As-
signments Rejected by Olivia de Havilland, and comparative cost of replace-
ment artists.”98  The document identifies the salaries de Havilland would 
have been paid on each film and what Warner Bros. paid the replacement 
performer.  On two films,99 Warner Bros. paid more for the replacement art-
ist, and paid less on the other two pictures.100  In total, Warner Bros. would 
have paid de Havilland $60,165 for all four films and paid the replacement 
artists $57,690.  The studio’s own internal analysis demonstrates it would 
have been difficult for the studio to recover damages for increased expendi-
tures, since it paid $2,475 less to the replacement artists overall. 
Despite the difficulty of attaining actual damages, studios still threat-
ened performers who refused assignments with a claim for damages.  For 
instance, in a different dispute with Bette Davis in 1934, the studio sent a 
letter informing her that she was required to appear at the studio for wardrobe 
fittings and other preparations for a picture called Case of the Howling 
                                                          
93. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared, supra note 92. 
94. See supra note 39 (defining “loan-outs”). 
95. See Pictures in Which Olivia DeHaviland Appeared, supra note 92.  
96. See List of Pictures Rejected by Miss DeHavilland, supra note 92.  
97. See id.   
98. Picture Assignments Rejected by Olivia DeHavilland, and Comparative Cost of Re-
placement Artists (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).  
99. See id.   
100. See id.   
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Dog.101  The letter stated that since she failed to appear, the studio would 
“hold [Davis] responsible for all damages which have accrued or may accrue 
to [the studio] as a result of [Davis’s] failure, refusal or neglect to so per-
form[] . . . .”102 
A lawsuit seeking damages posed difficult problems of proof.  The 
remedy’s impact as a disciplinary tool was diminished by the potential for a 
long period of time to pass before a resolution was reached.  Moreover, this 
remedy did not protect the studio’s interest as effectively as an injunction, 
and further did not work as a method to force stars back to work.103 
C. Injunctive Relief and Personal Service Contracts 
Since the remedy of damages was not effective for studios, injunctive 
relief was their remedy of choice.  Part III.C provides a brief summary of 
California law with respect to injunctions and personal service contracts, 
which will shed light on why the studio contracts were drafted the way they 
were.  Part III.C also provides a brief overview of relevant English law to fill 
in the legal landscape of the Nelson case. 
1. California Law 
The California statute which allowed some personal service contracts 
to be enforced with injunctive relief was amended between the Nelson and 
De Haviland cases, but as discussed below, the substance of the statute was 
the same in all relevant respects.  Until 1919, section 3423 of the Civil Code 
of California prohibited the use of injunctions to prevent a breach of con-
tract.104  In 1931, the statute was re-codified as section 1980 of the Civil 
                                                          
101. CASE OF THE HOWLING DOG (Warner Bros. 1934).  See Letter from Paul A. Chase, 
Assistant Sec’y, Warner Bros. to Bette Davis (June 14, 1934) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives 
at the University of Southern California).   
102. Letter from Paul A. Chase to Bette Davis, supra note 101.  At times, studio contracts 
provided that the star shall pay for costs and expenses incurred due to the star’s absence unless the 
absence was the result of “unavoidable physical disability.”  See Contract Between Warner Bros. 
Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 9. 
103. In Warner Bros. v. Nelson, Warner Bros. specifically argued in the London court that 
the difficulty of estimating damages meant that injunctive relief was more appropriate.  Warner 
Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209, 210. 
104. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 987 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944); see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 n.29 (1983) (discussing evolution of California stat-
utes and personal service contracts from 1872 to 1937).  
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Code and amended to allow injunctive relief for the breach of a certain type 
of personal service contract as described in the next paragraph.105  In 1937, 
section 1980 of the Civil Code was repealed and section 2855 of the Labor 
Code was enacted.106  The court in De Haviland held section 2855 was a 
restatement and continuation of Civil Code section 1980 and not a new en-
actment.107  In effect, the court stated that the California statute applicable to 
personal service contracts was the same during the time that both Davis and 
de Havilland were under contract with Warner Bros.108   
Injunctive relief was permitted only if the personal service contract sat-
isfied two requirements: the contract provided for a service of a “special, 
unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character,” and provided a rate 
of compensation of a minimum of $6,000 per year.109  The first requirement 
has been called the “unique and extraordinary services rule.” 110  If the ser-
vices were not unique or extraordinary, damages were the appropriate rem-
edy.111  The reasoning behind the requirement is that when others can be 
found to perform the services, the cost of replacement can be readily calcu-
lated.112  This section of the statute was incorporated in paragraph 22 of Da-
vis’s contract.113 
                                                          
105. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 987 (discussing the history of the California statute); see 
also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656 (noting that the term for personal service contracts was expanded 
from five years to seven years in the 1931 amendment). 
106. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986; see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 656 (“The statute 
was transferred into the Labor Code in 1937 as section 2855 pursuant to the Industrial Labor Rela-
tions Act.”). 
107. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 985.   
108. See id. at 986 (discussing the consistency of section 1980 of the Civil Code and section 
2855 of the Labor Code).   
109. See id. at 985, 987. 
110. David Tannenbaum, Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts in the Entertainment 
Industry, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 18, 21 (1954). 
111. See Steinberg, supra note 8, at 99, n.43. 
112. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 51 (10th ed. 2005). 
113. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 
11.  See also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 657 (“The employer includes such provisions in the contract 
in order to satisfy the condition precedent to obtaining injunctive relief: that the services be unique 
and extraordinary”). 
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A second requirement must also be met before an injunction is ordered 
to enforce a personal service contract.114  The contract must provide a mini-
mum amount of compensation.115  In 1919, this amount was set at the rate of 
$6,000 per year.116  Converted to contemporary dollars, the statutory require-
ment is equal to approximately $100,000 per year.117  The dollar amount 
suggests the legislature intended this exception to apply to people whose per-
sonal services were valued highly. 
On the surface, the statute seemed to allow for broad injunctive relief; 
however, the courts have held an injunction cannot require the employee to 
render personal services or to hire another to perform personal services.118  
Several reasons have been recognized for limiting injunctive relief in the en-
forcement of personal service contracts: the difficulty in enforcement; the 
unsatisfactory character of services rendered when compelled; and, if phys-
ical labor is involved, the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of involun-
tary servitude.119  Rather, the statute has been interpreted to allow an injunc-
tion to enforce a negative promise only, such as a promise to render services 
exclusively.120 
2. English Law121 
The Davis contract did not contain an explicit choice of law provision.  
The court in Nelson122 applied British law without discussing choice of law 
principles.  By 1936, both jurisdictions viewed injunctive relief which 
                                                          
114. See De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 987. 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 48 (10th ed. 2005). 
118. See 13 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 52 (10th ed. 2005); 
Steinberg, supra note 8, at 91 n.3 (specific performance cannot be used to enforce a party’s obliga-
tions to perform under the terms of a personal service contract in California) (citing Poultry Pro-
ducers of S. Ca., Inc. v. Barlow, 189 Cal. 278, 288, 208 P. 93, 97 (1922)). 
119. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 48, supra note 117. 
120. See SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 52, supra note 118. 
121. A nuanced comparison of British and American law is beyond the scope of this article. 
122. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209. 
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enforced a “negative stipulation not to serve any third person within the time 
agreed” as an appropriate remedy for the breach of a personal service con-
tract.123 
In 1852, England’s High Court of Chancery issued its landmark124 
opinion in Lumley v. Wagner.125 Lumley owned an opera house and con-
tracted with the opera singer Johanna Wagner, the niece of composer Rich-
ard Wagner, to perform at Lumley’s opera house for three months.126  The 
contract contained a covenant in which Wagner promised not to render her 
services for any other theater.127  Before the contract expired, a rival opera 
house offered her more money to sing, and she accepted.128  Lumley sued, 
and the court held that although it could not compel her to sing for Lumley, 
it would enforce the covenant not to sing for another.129   
In subsequent cases, English courts enjoined performers who would not 
be considered stars in their fields. 130  As one legal commentator put it, “the 
English courts are not impressed by this ‘unique and extraordinary services’ 
rule.” 131  In Grimston v. Cuningham, the court issued an injunction against 
an understudy.132  In Lanner v. Palace Theatre Ltd., 133 the court rejected the 
                                                          
123. See, e.g., Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 336 (1897) (citing Lumley v. Wagner, 
42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852)). 
124. See Axelrod, supra note 75 at 410; Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 18 (“the single, 
well-accepted principle that, under appropriate circumstances, equity will enjoin the breach of a 
covenant in an artiste’s contract not to perform for others, can be traced back directly to the land-
mark case of Lumley v. Wagner[]”). 
125. Lumley v. Wagner (1852), 42 Eng. Rep. 687. 
126. Id. at 605. 
127. Id. at 606. 
128. Id. at 606–07. 
129. Id. at 619. 
130. American courts have enjoined a variety of performers and athletes from providing 
their services to third parties before their contracts expired.  See Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 
21–22. 
131. Id. at 22. 
132. Grimston v. Cunningham, [1894] 1 Q.B. 125 (Eng.). 
133. Lanner v. Palace Theatre Ltd., [1893] 9 T.L.R. 162, 165 (Eng.). 
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argument that a distinction should be made based on the “eminence” of a 
performer before issuing an injunction.134  The plaintiff, a renowned ballet 
instructor, entered into six-year contracts with her students in which she 
promised to train them and took a percentage of their wages for work she 
found them.135  The students agreed in the contracts not to perform for any-
one else.136  Two of her students signed contracts to perform at the Palace 
Theater, and Lanner sued to enjoin them from performing.137  One of the 
student’s attorneys argued that the court should not follow Lumley, because 
Lumley involved a performer who “had some special qualifications which 
could not be dispensed with or replaced—e.g., those of a prima donna . . . . 
”138  The court rejected this argument explaining “[t]o distinguish between 
degrees of excellence and to determine who was an indispensable performer 
or who was not would be a very difficult task for the Court.”139  These deci-
sions show that English courts considered the personal service provided by 
most artists and performers to be sufficiently unique and specialized in order 
to be enjoined.140   
If English courts enjoined an understudy and a ballet student, certainly 
Bette Davis would be enjoined.  Notably, in the case of Gaumont British 
Corporation Ltd. v. Alexander,141 which was decided in the same year as 
Davis’s case and also involved a film actor and film studio, the court ruled 
that the contract which required the actor to provide her services exclusively 
to the studio during the term of the contract was not an unlawful restraint of 
trade.142  Furthermore, establishing that Bette Davis’s services were unique 
and extraordinary would not be difficult.  Her contract, like similar studio 
contracts, provided that the parties agreed “the services to be rendered by the 
                                                          
134. Id. at 163. 
135. Id. at 162. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 163. 
139. Id. 
140. See Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 22. 
141. Gaumont Corp. v. Alexander [1936] 2 All E.R. 1686 (Eng.). 
142. See id. (affirming arbitrator’s decision). 
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Artist . . . are of a special, unique, extraordinary and intellectual character[] 
. . . .”143   
D. Davis’s Strategy 
Davis and her legal team probably knew an English court would en-
force the contract.144  They gambled that they could show the contract was 
so unfair it should not be enforced at all.145  The Times Law Report summa-
rized Davis’s claims as follows: Warner Bros. “required [Davis] to play un-
suitable parts, and had frequently required her to work for excessive periods 
in the day, such periods constantly exceeding 14 hours; and that [Warner 
Bros.] had further required [Davis] to make an unreasonably large number 
of films in 1935.”146  It was reported to counsel for Warner Bros. that Davis 
claimed she was required to work more than forty weeks that year in viola-
tion of her contract.147   
Sir Patrick Hastings, counsel for Warner Bros., responded by charac-
terizing Davis’s claims as “the actions of a very naughty young lady.”148  In 
response to Davis’s counsel’s characterization of her contractual obligations 
as “slavery,” Sir Patrick focused on the graduating salary scale outline in her 
                                                          
143. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 
11. 
144. According to Sikov and his review of The Bette Davis Collection, Ludovico Toeplitz, 
in fact, told Davis as early as August of 1936, that he was advised by his counsel that her contract 
with Warner Bros. was valid; she could not legally contract with Toeplitz; Warner Bros. would be 
successful in obtaining an injunction; and that he was recasting her part.  SIKOV, supra note 7, at 
94. 
145. The year 1936 was a busy year for the Warner Bros. legal department.  In addition to 
Davis’s case, the studio defended separate lawsuits filed by actors James Cagney and Ann Dvorak. 
See discussion infra note 178.  James Cagney successfully claimed that his contract with Warner 
Bros. should be terminated after the studio materially breached it, thus entitling him to an annul-
ment of the contract.  See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 88–89, Cagney v. Warner 
Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Apr. 2, 1936) (on file with the Warner Bros. Archives at the University of 
Southern California).  The Los Angeles Times declared with a touch of hyperbole that the Cagney 
case made “iron-bound contracts . . . things of the past.”  Edwin Schallert, Cagney’s Victory Opens 
Door for Stars’ Walkouts, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1936, at C1. 
146. Law Report, Oct. 14, THE TIMES, Oct. 15, 1936, at 4. 
147. Telegram from Manuel Espinosa to Roy J. Obringer (Sept. 24, 1936) (on file with the 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
148. SIKOV, supra note 7, at 92. 
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contract, and said “[i]f anybody wants to put me into perpetual servitude on 
that basis of remuneration, I shall prepare to consider it.”149  Davis enter-
tained homicidal thoughts against Sir Patrick,150 and took to staring at the 
judge, Mr. Justice Sir George Branson, in an effort to hypnotize him151 with 
her “Bette Davis Eyes.”152 
E. The Outcome of Warner Bros. v. Nelson 
Despite the best efforts of Davis’s counsel, Sir William Jowitt, she did 
not prevail.153  Davis did not testify, and the court held it against her.154  The 
court stated in its opinion that she had “broken her positive undertakings in 
the contract without any cause or excuse which she was prepared to support 
in the witness-box.”155  Elsewhere, the court held Davis “for no discoverable 
reason except that she wanted more money, declined to be further bound by 
the agreement, left the United States and, in September, entered into an 
agreement in [England] with a third person.”156 
The court issued an injunction in favor of Warner Bros., barring Davis 
from appearing on stage or in motion picture productions for any studios 
other than Warner Bros. without the studio’s consent for three years, or for 
the remaining term on her contract, whichever was less.157  The court relied 
on the contract’s exclusivity provision and legal precedent such as Lumley.158  
                                                          
149. Id. 
150. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 153. 
151. Id. at 155. 
152. KIM CARNES, Bette Davis Eyes, on MISTAKEN IDENTITY (EMI America 1981); 
SIKOV, supra note 7, at 414 (the song “celebrated the mysterious allure of [Davis’s] most notable 
features”). 
153. DAVIS, supra note 59, at 155 (according to Davis, “[Sir William] made a beautiful and 
impassioned plea for [her] rights.”). 
154. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson, [1937] 1 K.B. 209. 
155. Id. at 215–16. 
156. Id. at 213. 
157. Id. at 222. 
158. Lumley v. Wagner (1852), 42 Eng. Rep. 687–88. 
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The court recognized that the interest of Warner Bros. in need of protecting 
was “vague,” but held that the studio’s films with Davis that were completed, 
yet unreleased, would depreciate in value if she appeared in films released 
by others.159  The court held the three-year injunction served that purpose.160  
The outcome was an utter defeat for Davis and other stars bound by similar 
contracts, except in one respect.161 
F. Suspension/Extension Under Scrutiny 
During the Nelson trial, clause 23 of Davis’s contract, which allowed 
the studio to add suspension time to the duration of the contract, came under 
scrutiny.162  On day two of the trial, Sir William zeroed in on clause 23.  He 
posed a hypothetical to the court: 
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: Let me assume that this lady . . . de-
cides:  I will not work for anybody else; it is a very long time to 
wait, but I will wait until 1942, and then at last by 1942 I shall be 
free to exercise my art once more.  Not at all. She will not have 
utilized or eaten up any of the time [of the contract term], because 
the period, let alone the extended periods, will never have come 
to an end . . . unless and until this lady carries out her contractual 
obligation, the period of time during which this bar is to last never 
comes to an end . . . It is a life sentence, therefore.163 
After further discussion, Sir William quoted from a letter sent to Davis from 
Warner Bros., dated June 20, 1936.164  The letter was a typical example of 
the written notice issued by Warner Bros. to inform an artist that she was 
                                                          
159. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 1 K.B. at 221–22. 
160. Id. at 222. 
161. Actor and friend George Arliss persuaded Davis not to appeal.  See DAVIS, supra note 
59, at 158–59.   
162. See Contract Between Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. and Bette Davis, supra note 37, at 
12–13. 
163. Transcript of Hearing at 24, Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Nelson (1936) (on file with 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
164. Id. at 25. 
BRODERICK_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2021  11:25 PM 
2021] WARNER BROS. V. NELSON 133 
placed on suspension.165  The letter incorporated clause 23 and stated the 
studio had the right to add the period of suspension to the term of the con-
tract.166  From a trial strategy point of view, reading the letter in court showed 
that the contractual language truly governed the parties’ relationship, and 
that clause 23 accurately demonstrated the actual business practice of the 
studio.   
Justice Branson clarified for himself that the studio had the discretion 
to extend the term of the contract until Davis returned to work. 
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON: If your case is correct, the effect of 
the exercise of the option to extend in the letter of the 20th June is 
to keep open the period, which would otherwise end on the 2nd 
January, until she shall have consented to go back to them. 
 
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: Yes. 
 
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON: And that would last indefinitely. 
 
SIR WILLIAM JOWITT: It lasts indefinitely . . . . 167 
This part of the hearing must have set off alarms in Warner Bros.’s legal 
camp.  Although Justice Branson never stated that clause 23 was invalid, or 
that it would prevent him from issuing an injunction, his demeanor must have 
spoken volumes to Warner Bros.’s counsel.  The first item of business on 
day three of the hearing was Warner Bros.’s counsel waiving the studio’s 
rights under clause 23. 
SIR PATRICK HASTINGS:  We are proposing to suggest to your 
Lordship that, for the purpose of the injunction and no other pur-
pose, we should voluntarily forego as from to-day any rights un-
der Clause 23, which is the suspension clause.168 
                                                          
165. Id. at 26. 
166. Id. at 24–25. 
167. Id. at 26.   
168. See Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files (Nov. 11, 1936) (on file with 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
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Since the waiver was buried in the middle of a longer speech, the court 
requested clarification. 
MR. JUSTICE BRANSON:  I do not quite follow that.  You are 
saying that, if this is carried out, you voluntarily forego as from 
to-day the right to extend the existing period? 
 
SIR PATRICK HASTINGS:  We forego the suspension clause; 
therefore, the contract will come to an end.169 
The waiver admits implicitly that the contract could last indefinitely and that 
this was problematic under the law.  After the court issued the injunction, 
counsel for Warner Bros. explained that the waiver was essential to vic-
tory.170  In a letter dated on October 20, 1936 to Robert W. Perkins, General 
Counsel for Warner Bros., English counsel advised that “[t]he Suspension 
Clause contained in [Clause] 23 proved the most troublesome clause . . . 
[and] accordingly instructed Counsel to waive [Warner Bros.’s] rights under 
the Suspension Clause . . . .”171 
The Times Law Report dutifully reported the waiver,172 but the legal 
maneuver did not seem to find its way into the American press, much less its 
significance.173  In 1954, a member of the Los Angeles Bar discussed the 
waiver in a published law journal article about enforcement of personal ser-
vice contracts.174  Without the benefit of primary sources, such as hearing 
transcripts or studio records, the author admittedly could only guess at the 
significance of the waiver, and speculated that it “apparently” was intended 
to signal to the court that the studio “was ready, willing and able to perform 
its part of the contract[.]”175   
                                                          
169.  Id. 
170. See Letter from Denton, Hall & Burgin to Robert W. Perkins (Oct. 20, 1936) (on file 
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
171. Id. 
172. Law Report, Oct. 16, THE TIMES, Oct. 17, 1936, at 4. 
173. See, e.g., Bette Davis Barred From British Film, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1936, at 31; 
Court Curbs Bette Davis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1936, at 2. 
174. Tannenbaum, supra note 110, at 18–19. 
175. Id. at 24–25.  A scholarly film essay originally published in 1988 discussed how 
Warner Bros.’s English counsel found the suspension/extension clauses problematic, but the essay 
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Was the waiver significant?  The case was set in a foreign court, and 
since it does not appear that the American press reported on the waiver, it is 
not clear when American lawyers would learn about the waiver and the rea-
sons behind it.176  English courts were more interested in weighing equities 
of an individual case rather than establishing consistent precedent as com-
pared to U.S. courts.177  In any event, an English trial court decision had zero 
precedential value in the U.S.  And yet, Warner Bros. and its counsel must 
have thought the waiver was significant.178  The Warner Bros. archives at the 
University of Southern California contain a number of correspondences be-
tween Warner Bros. legal department and their London counsel showing that 
not only did outside counsel advise Warner Bros. that Clause 23 violated 
public policy to such a degree that counsel did not want to defend it in 
court—eight years before the landmark De Haviland case—but Warner 
Bros.’s general counsel also considered changing the contract, the cudgel of 
the star system, altogether. 
After reviewing the court’s opinion and English counsel’s October 20 
letter,179 Perkins wrote to Warner Bros.’s outside counsel in Los Angeles, 
Freston & Files, stating, “this litigation affords a good many hints . . . as to 
possible revisions of our form of contract.”180  He further agreed that the 
                                                          
did not discuss the in-court waiver, Sir William Jowitt’s arguments to the court about the suspen-
sion/extension clauses, nor that Warner Bros. considered rewriting its standard personal service 
contract to limit the practice of suspension/extension.  See SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81. 
176. See Law Report, Oct. 16, supra note 172. 
177. Steinberg, supra note 8, at 110.  
178. Warner Bros. received some validation in the summer of 1936.  See Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law at 1, 11–12, Fenton v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Cal. Super. Ct., July 1, 
1936) (No. 396484) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).  
The case was filed by actress Ann Dvorak under her married name of Fenton.  She alleged Warner 
Bros. breached its contract by placing her on medical suspension, even though she claimed she was 
sufficiently healthy and able to work, thus entitling her to a termination of contract remedy.  On 
July 1, 1936, the court ruled against Dvorak in a decision she chose not to appeal, holding that the 
studio had the right to place her on suspension pursuant to the contract since Warner Bros. had 
acted in good faith and based its decision on medical advice.  The court decided that the studio 
could extend her contract by the length of time she was on suspension.   
179. See Letter from Denton, Hall, & Burgin to Robert W. Perkins, supra note 170. 
180. Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files, Law Office (Oct. 29, 1936) (on file 
with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
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court’s concern about binding Davis too long to the contract “impelled the 
court to limit the effect of his injunction to the period of three years.”181 
However, Perkins’s letter indicates that he did not believe that the stu-
dio’s right to extend the term of the contract should be capped.  On the con-
trary, he characterized the issue as the court not understanding California 
law, and that California law allowed for a longer injunction.182  He proposed 
revising the contract with a reference or quote from California law, which 
provided that personal service contracts could have a term of seven years.183  
If the contract referred to California law, and showed both parties were aware 
of California law, the court may have felt more comfortable issuing a seven-
year injunction.184 
Subsequently, the studio’s English lawyers made their own recommen-
dation, and advised that Clause 23 should be revised.  “[I]t will, when this 
case is completed, be desirable to consider the provisions of the Bette Davis 
type of Contract in the light of the Court’s observations . . . It seems to us 
that the chief point for consideration will be the Suspension Clause, Clause 
23.”185  Counsel characterized the clause as “unnecessarily wide for the pro-
tection of a Producing Company,” and recommended substantially limiting 
the amount of time a contract term could be extended based on suspension 
periods. 186  Counsel wrote: 
We think that the period of prolongation when suspension is ex-
ercised might be limited either to a definite number of weeks, as 
for example six weeks, or to such a period as would be required 
to enable the Producer to complete the film actually in making 
when the Star walks out[] . . . .187   
                                                          
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id.  Perkins was probably referring to section 1980 of the Civil Code, which was re-
pealed and replaced with section 2855 of the Labor Code in 1937.   
184. Id. 
185. Letter from Denton, Hall & Burgin, to Robert W. Perkins (Oct. 22, 1936) (on file with 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California).   
186. Id. 
187. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Perkins’s next correspondence to Freston & Files revealed he felt conflicted 
about limiting the studio’s right to extend the contract.188  At first, he in-
structed Freston & Files that the recommended limitation “should be seri-
ously considered.”189  However, the letter further sets forth reasons why the 
studio needed the suspension/extension clauses in their present form.190  For 
instance, Perkins was open to a limited suspension period at the beginning 
of the contract, but if the artist breached in his last year, “the artist might 
very well wait the contract out.”191  If the breach occurred earlier in the con-
tract, the artist still might wait out the current term of the contract until the 
studio renewed its option, and then return at a higher salary.192 
Next, Perkins set forth his interpretation of California law, which 
would be tested in the De Haviland case.  This section also seems tinged 
with conflict: “I still cling to the thought that the California law by statute 
validates personal service contracts of this nature . . . .”193  In his view, the 
seven-year limit on personal service contracts included “[t]he time the con-
tract has to run, plus the period of suspension, plus the period then or there-
after to run, including all options exercised[] . . . .”194  What Perkins wrote 
next reveals his struggle to reconcile his interpretation of California law and 
how that interpretation conflicts with California law: “An indefinite suspen-
sion, however, even if limited by the seven-year aggregate, might be unde-
sirable[] . . . .”195 
How could a seven-year contract result in an indefinite suspension?  At 
first glance, Perkins seems to accept that the statutory limit starts from the 
date the contract is signed and ends seven calendar-years later.  But in fact, 
he interpreted the statute to mean seven years of actual work—no matter how 
                                                          
188. See Letter from Robert W. Perkins to Freston & Files (Nov. 6, 1936) (on file with 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California). 
189. Perkins further writes that Jack Warner “was willing to write the clause that way.”  Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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long it took for the employee to accumulate those seven years.196  This is the 
interpretation he “clung” to in the face of a strong opposing view—a view 
he turned to again at the end of the discussion: “it might be better to limit the 
suspension to six or twelve months.”197 
In what appears to be the last correspondence in the file from Perkins 
regarding the Nelson litigation, revising Clause 23 is not mentioned.198  The 
tone of the letter is considerably different.  The clause’s importance is reaf-
firmed: “[t]he waiver might have been a high price to pay but I believe that 
we got value received.”199  The letter’s main subject is the effect of the 
waiver on the duration of the present term of the contract, and the timing of 
the studio’s exercise of the next option.200  As far as the issue of validity was 
concerned, Perkins put the matter to rest: 
There was nothing in the litigation in England which indicated 
that it was not valid.  I know of nothing in any American case 
which would indicate that it was not valid.  The only question 
raised about it was whether if it were permitted to run indefinitely 
a court of equity would grant an injunction, and that is a question 
of remedy and not of validity.201 
The last sentence seems to run counter to the relationship between rights and 
remedies.  Entitlement to a remedy is inextricably connected to one’s rights, 
and here, the studio’s rights were sourced in the validity of its contract.  Alt-
hough more internal discussion may have taken place about Clause 23, the 
studio continued to place actors on suspensions and extend the duration of 
their contracts, as evidenced by de Havilland’s case.202   
                                                          
196. Id.  
197. Id. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Perkins’ interpretation of the hearing transcripts of the “English litigation” does not 
align with local counsel’s view of the court’s attitude toward Clause 23.  Id. 
202. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944). 
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IV. A CASE FORESHADOWED: DE HAVILAND V. WARNER BROS. 
  The trouble Warner Bros. faced in Nelson over Clause 23 was the 
forerunner of their next legal hurdle in De Haviland v. Warner Bros. eight 
years later.203  Suspension/extension came under scrutiny again and the scru-
tiny could not be avoided this time.204  De Havilland’s lawsuit was a direct 
challenge to the studio’s interpretation and application of the suspension 
clause.205   
In 1943, de Havilland, like Davis in 1936, was discontent with her sit-
uation at Warner Bros.; the studio was not assigning her the challenging roles 
she craved, and was paying her a fraction of what it paid her frequent male 
co-star Errol Flynn.206  She had become a major star because of Gone with 
the Wind.207  When the seven-year term of her contract ended in mid-1943, 
de Havilland learned it was in fact not over because the studio was tacking 
on six months on for suspensions she incurred during her contract term.208   
De Havilland’s attorney, Martin Gang, made it clear in the pleading he 
filed on her behalf and in his other communications with the studio that the 
actor was taking direct aim at suspension/extension.209  Gang filed an action 
                                                          
203. Id. at 985. 
204. See infra notes 206–13 and accompanying text. 
205. See infra notes 206–13 and accompanying text. 
206. See Stipanowich, supra note 48.  Warner Bros. exercised all six options in its contract 
with de Havilland from 1936 to 1943.  De Havilland was a minor when she first contracted with 
Warner Bros., and because of her minor status, the contract was “reviewed and approved by the 
Los Angeles Superior Court . . . as ‘just, fair and conscionable.’”  Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 666–
68.   
207. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 306. 
208. See Stipanowich, supra note 48. 
209. Memorandum from Roy J. Obringer to Jack Warner (Aug. 19, 1943) (on file with 
Warner Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California) (summarizing a telephone call 
from Martin Gang in which he asked “whether we were aware that our 7 years on OLIVIA 
DEHAVILLAND expired in May”) (emphasis in original); see also Memorandum from Roy J. 
Obringer to Jack Warner (Aug. 24, 1936) (on file with Warner Bros. Archives at the University of 
Southern California) (summarizing the complaint filed by Gang on de Havilland’s behalf as 
“merely reciting” when the contract started and that “the 7 years ran out”); see also AMADOR, supra 
note 47, at 142 (relating a pre-filing conversation between de Havilland and Gang in which Gang 
expressed his opinion that seven years “meant seven calendar years, with no provision for addi-
tional time due to suspensions”). 
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for declaratory judgment seeking to declare de Havilland’s contract had 
ended because it had run for seven years from the date of execution.210  Once 
Jack Warner learned this was the issue being raised by de Havilland, he rec-
ognized that it was significant, perhaps recalling the issue having been raised 
in connection with the Nelson case.211 
De Havilland prevailed in the lower court and Warner Bros. ap-
pealed.212  The central issue was whether the legislature intended the seven-
year limitation on the length of personal service contracts to be calculated in 
terms of calendar years or the time of actual service.213  To justify the prac-
tice of suspension/extension, Warner Bros. trotted out its interpretation of 
the law that seven years meant seven years of actual work.214  After the court 
outlined the history of section 2855 of the Labor Code,215 the court rejected 
Warner Bros.’s argument and interpreted the statute to mean seven calendar 
years.216  The court identified public policy reasons for the statutory time 
limit imposed on personal service contracts such as an employee’s freedom 
to change his employer or occupation, and, as an employee grows “more 
experienced and skillful there should be a reasonable opportunity to move 
upward . . . .”217  The De Haviland decision brought an end to a powerful 
                                                          
210. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 985 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944). 
211. Memorandum from Jack Warner to Ralph Lewis (Aug. 20, 1943) (on file with Warner 
Bros. Archives at the University of Southern California) (Warner writes that the “Olivia De Havil-
land situation is a very serious matter”). 
212. See generally De Haviland, 153 P.2d 983.  
213. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 986, 987–88 (declaring that since the statute created rights 
to promote the welfare of the general public, time limits cannot be waived by an artist).   
214. Id. at 985; see also Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 666 n.75 (1983) (describing Warner 
Bros.’s position as “an extensive semantic argument”). 
215. De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 985. 
216. Id. at 986.  “It cannot be questioned that the limitation of time to which section 1980 
related from 1872 to 1931 was one to be measured in calendar years.”   
217. Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 667.  Id. at 653, 654, 681 (arguing that section 2855 provides 
an “open-market break” for the employee, which is “the interval following the termination of a 
contractual commitment when an employee is free to negotiate for his services on the open mar-
ket”).  One year after the De Haviland decision, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
a case involving a star placed on suspension by his studio for refusing a role.  When actor Robert 
Cummings reported for work at the end of his suspension and attempted to collect his first post-
suspension paycheck, the studio refused to pay him.  Cummings filed suit to declare the contract 
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tool used by the studios to manage labor, and ended a practice that subverted 
the public policy of the state of California.218 
V. ENDURING IMPACT OF NELSON AND DE HAVILAND 
Bette Davis was one of three major female stars who challenged the 
studio system in a significant way.219  Davis described herself as a “pioneer 
in trying to break the studio system’s hold on actors.”220  Her struggle was 
an early instance of a fight for equal pay in Hollywood—a fight that is still 
being waged today.221 
A significant part of her dispute with Warner Bros. before she left for 
England was the inequality in pay between her and male actors.222  It was 
not simply a matter of her opinion or subjective perception; Warner Bros. 
did pay men more than women, even when a man and woman starred in the 
                                                          
terminated based on the studio’s breach.  In affirming the lower court, the Ninth Circuit specifically 
addressed the studio’s defense that it had the right to keep Cummings on suspension indefinitely:  
“A continued suspension and refusal to pay appellee’s compensation, coupled with a continuous 
extension of the contract for like periods and a prohibition with the contract against [Cummings’s] 
right to offer his services to any other employer could deny to [Cummings] forever the right to 
work at his profession and earn a livelihood.”  The court’s opinion does not reference the De 
Haviland case nor § 2855.  Universal Pictures Co. v. Cummings, 150 F.2d 986, 987–88 (9th Cir. 
1945); see De Haviland, 153 P.2d at 988. 
218. Warner Bros. petitioned the California Supreme Court but was denied a hearing.  See 
Blaufarb, supra note 2, at 668–69 and accompanying notes. 
219. See Fowler, supra note 8, at 27–28 (naming the three women as Davis, de Havilland, 
and Mary Pickford). 
220. CHARLOTTE CHANDLER, THE GIRL WHO WALKED HOME 110 (2006).  Directly con-
fronting the majors over suspension/extension was a major risk for actors.  See Stipanowich, supra 
note 48.  Jack Warner tried to stop other studios from hiring de Havilland after she prevailed in 
court.  See AMADOR, supra note 47, at 143; HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216.  
221. See, e.g., Ashley Lee, Jennifer Lawrence Pens Essay: “Why Do I Make Less Than My 
Male Co-Stars?”, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Oct. 13, 2015, 7:06 AM), https://www.holly-
woodreporter.com/news/jennifer-lawrence-pens-essay-why-831635 [https://perma.cc/FB5H-
BHW5]; Dave McNary, SAG-AFTRA Exploring Pay Disparity on “All the Money in the World” 
ReShoots, VARIETY (Jan. 10, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://variety.com/2018/film/news/sag-aftra-pay-
disparity-all-the-money-in-the-world-re-shoots-1202660831/ [https://perma.cc/V56K-JPMD]. 
222. See Whitaker, supra note 61, at C1. 
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same movie and were given equal billing.223  Not only did Warner Bros. pay 
male stars more than Davis, but male supporting actors and character actors 
could be paid double what Davis made.224   
To some extent, this Article corrects the record in a small but meaning-
ful way about Davis’s struggle for equal treatment and artistic freedom.  Her 
case is viewed, not incorrectly, as a valiant loss on an issue on which de 
Havilland later won.225  One notable distinction between the two cases is that 
de Havilland filed her lawsuit after she had completed the original seven-
year term on her contract, whereas Davis still had time left on her 1934 con-
tract when Warner Bros. sued her for an injunction in 1936.226   
But Davis and her legal team deserve more credit than for simply try-
ing.  Only with archival research can the studio’s waiver be properly contex-
tualized.227  A connection does not appear to have been made previously be-
tween the waiver, Davis’s counsel’s arguments to the court, and Warner 
Bros.’s British counsel’s concerns about suspension/extension.228  The argu-
ments in Nelson, and the behind-the-scenes reaction to the arguments by the 
Warner Bros. legal team, concretely foreshadowed the De Haviland case 
years in advance.229  The De Havilland Law itself has been utilized up to the 
                                                          
223. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 133 (“Men were better paid than women, even in films 
where women got equal billing”); see also SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 77 (describing how Davis 
lagged behind her male colleagues in terms of salary and status at Warner Bros.). 
224. SIKOV, supra note 7, at 106.  Davis was paid 2.5 times less than supporting actor Guy 
Kibbee. 
225. See, e.g., AMADOR, supra note 47, at 13 (“[De Havilland] broke Hollywood’s contract 
system by winning her landmark lawsuit against tenacious Jack Warner when Bette Davis 
couldn’t”); Matthew Belloni, De Havilland Lawsuit Resonates Through Hollywood, REUTERS 
(Aug. 23, 2007, 7:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/industry-lawsuit-dc/de-havilland-law-
suit-resonates-through-hollywood-idUSN2329585820070824 [https://perma.cc/LZJ5-VLWU] 
(“Bette Davis lost a similar case in the 1930s”); TONY THOMAS, THE FILMS OF OLIVIA DE 
HAVILLAND 37 (1st ed. 1983) (Davis “mounted an unsuccessful lawsuit” challenging suspension 
and extension).   
226. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216. 
227. See supra Part III Section F.   
228. See supra Part III Section F.   
229. See SCHATZ, supra note 40, at 81 n.22 (observing that Warner Bros.’s British coun-
sel’s reservations about suspension/extension mirrored those of the court in the De Haviland case); 
DAVIS, supra note 59, at 160 (“the publicity attendant to my litigation paved the way for Olivia de 
Havilland’s eventual court victory over the immoral suspension clause.”). 
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present-day by recording artists,230 boxers231 and even talent agents232 to can-
cel long-term contracts.  Questions remain about how the rule will be applied 
in the context of Major League Baseball,233 “360 deals” in the music indus-
try,234 and in the arena of mixed martial arts.235  Today, section 2855 is often 
used as a tool for contract negotiation.236 
Finally, Davis and de Havilland’s struggle to liberate artists from the 
oppressive use of long-term contracts resonates today in yet another way.  A 
connection can be traced from the De Haviland case to the present-day labor 
dispute between the Writers Guild of America (“WGA”)237 and the talent 
                                                          
230. When recording artists seek to cancel their contracts under § 2855, they are presented 
with unique issues under § 2855(b).  See, e.g., Kathryn Rosenberg, Restoring the Seven Year Rule 
in the Music Industry, 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 275, 294–95 (2015) (dis-
cussing the band 30STM’s efforts to cancel its contract with EMI); Gregg B. Ramer, Personal 
Service With a Smile: A History of California’s “Seven-Year” Rule, KATTENMUCHINROSENMAN 
LLP, https://katten.com/files/48984_Spotlight_on_Entertainment_and_Media%20Law_Personal
_Service_With_a%20Smile_A_History_of_Californias_Seven_Year_Rule.pdf [http://perma.cc
/SLZ5-LZT5] (“Section 2855(b)(3) creates a unique challenge with respect to the enforceability of 
music industry contracts.”). 
231. See De La Hoya v. Top Rank, Inc., No. 00-cv-9230-WMB, WL 34624886, at *12 
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2001). 
232. Belloni, supra note 225 (reporting that Agent Ed Limato used § 2855 to terminate his 
contract with ICM in order to join WME). 
233. See Mitchell Nathanson, More Than Just California Dreamin’?: California Labor 
Code §2855 and Its Applicability to Major League Baseball, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 23, 24 
(2017). 
234. See Patricia Tsai, Discovering the Full Potential of the 360 Deal: An Analysis of the 
Korean Pop Industry, Seven-Year Statute, and Talent Agencies Act of California, 20 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 324, 342 (2013). 
235. See Jeffrey B. Same, Breaking the Chokehold: An Analysis of Potential Defenses 
Against Coercive Contracts in Mixed Martial Arts, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1057, 1077–78 (2012). 
236. See, e.g., Ramer, supra note 230 (describing how the cast of the television series Mod-
ern Family invoked the statute in the middle of contract negotiations). 
237. See Agency Campaign Timeline (updated August 2020), WRITERS GUILD OF 
AMERICAN WEST, https://www.wga.org/members/membership-information/agency-agreement
/wga-agency-campaign-timeline.  See also Drea, supra note 23, at 121 (“The Writers Guild is the 
labor union that is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for writers in the entertainment 
industry.”). 
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agencies which represent WGA members.238  The through line begins with 
the changes that occurred in the wake of the De Haviland decision.  After 
stars were freed from long-term contracts and the practice of suspension/ex-
tension, they gained new artistic freedoms, and greater creative freedom in-
creased their power and independence.239   
Another development occurred a few years after the De Haviland de-
cision which involved neither Davis nor de Havilland, but nonetheless plays 
a significant part in the chain of events explored here.  In 1948, the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.240 ended the 
monopoly over the film industry held by the majors.241  As a result, the Big 
Five were forced to sell their theaters,242 and all of the majors had to end a 
host of monopolistic practices.243 
Thus, the De Haviland244 decision and the outcome of United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc.245 operated as a one-two punch against the studio 
                                                          
238. See Agency Campaign Timeline, supra note 237.  Four major talent agencies repre-
sented over sixty-five percent of the WGA members who had agents before the present dispute 
began.   
239. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206; CASPER, supra note 16 at 47. 
240. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 181 (1948); see also Drea, 
supra, note 23, at 110–12 (discussing history of the anti-trust litigation as it progressed from the 
trial court level to the U.S. Supreme Court and back to the trial court on remand). 
241. Before the trial court could implement the Supreme Court’s order to consider ordering 
the majors to divest their theater chains, two of the majors, RKO and Paramount, voluntarily signed 
a consent decree.  The final decision for the six remaining majors was filed in July 1949.  Drea, 
supra, note 23, at 101, 111 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 881 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff’d, 339 U.S. 974 (1950)).  
242. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 94. 
243. Drea, supra note 23, at 112. 
244. De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 153 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944). 
245. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 138 (1948). 
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system.246  The majors lost much of their negotiating power,247 and actors, 
writers, and directors flocked to talent agencies to help them negotiate better 
deals.248  Freelancing and non-exclusive contracts became standard practices 
for A-list stars, as long-term contracts ceased to be the norm.249   
Because they had so much talent in their stables, and their talent had 
negotiating power due to their new creative freedoms, agents rose in im-
portance.250  Their rise leads to the next step in the through line between 
Davis and de Havilland’s struggles and the recent labor dispute between 
writers and agents: the ascendancy of Lew Wasserman.251   
While working as a movie theater usher in high school, Wasserman 
developed his love for film.252  In 1936, he was hired by the Music Corpora-
tion of America (“MCA”), a Chicago agency that controlled band-book-
ings.253  Soon, MCA represented singers, comedians, and other perform-
ers.254  At this time, MCA also expanded its agency operations to the film 
                                                          
246. See HOLLYWOOD AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 216 (“The De Havilland Law was 
part of several larger film industry shifts that occurred in postwar Hollywood that helped to furnish 
the free agency that largely remains in place for A-list screen talent today.”).  The decline of film-
going audiences due to the growing popularity of television also contributed to the end of the clas-
sical studio era.  See Drea, supra note 23, at 114.   
247. Belloni, supra note 225 (discussing how De Haviland “shift[ed] negotiation power 
from studios to talent”). 
248. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (“[S]tars were able to choose their films, to order 
script changes, and to keep a percentage of box-office revenues.”).  While it is true that a number 
of actors, writers, and directors chose to seek representation in an effort to gain better deals, many 
of these artists needed representation to find employment due to the studio layoffs of talent and 
craftsmen.  See CASPER, supra note 16, at 46; Drea, supra note 23 at 114 (describing how studios 
had to layoff talent in order to reduce payrolls). 
249. See CASPER, supra note 16, at 47 (noting that the number of actors under contract with 
the major studios steadily declined in the postwar era). 
250. See GOMERY, supra note 1 at 205; CASPER, supra note 16, at 47; HOLLYWOOD AND 
THE LAW, supra note 9, at 217. 
251. See generally GOMERY, supra note 1, at 202–10.  Other important agents in the post-
war era included Ray Stark, Phil Gersh, and Irving “Swifty” Lazar.  See HOLLYWOOD AND THE 
LAW, supra note 9, at 217. 
252. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 204.   
253. Id. 
254. Id. 
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business, and Wasserman was asked to move to Hollywood.255  One of his 
earliest signings was Bette Davis in 1940.256  Davis and Wasserman were 
kindred spirits in the fight against the seven-year contract system.257  By 
1950, Lew Wasserman had become one of the most powerful talent agents 
in Hollywood with an impressive list of clients including actors, directors, 
and writers.258   
Wasserman deployed two business strategies that would change the in-
dustry.259  First, building on strategies agents occasionally used during the 
classic studio era,260 Wasserman made packaging a standard industry prac-
tice.261  Packaging was a way for Wasserman to maximize his commissions 
by filling a number of positions on a movie with his clients, such as with a 
writer, a director, and a star.262  Wasserman was able to package with regu-
larity because he represented many of the biggest names in the industry,263 
and unlike the development process during the classic studio era that was 
centered in the studios, the majority of feature films originated outside the 
major studios often with one of these names attached.264  Secondly, Wasser-
man created a production side to his agency.265  After obtaining a blanket 
                                                          
255. Drea, supra note 23, at 114. 
256. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 205. 
257. Id. at 206. 
258. Drea, supra note 23, at 114–15; GOMERY, supra note 1, at 205–06 (calling Wasserman 
the “king of the agents”). 
259. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (identifying packaging as the end of the classic 
studio era). 
260. See TOM KEMPER, HIDDEN TALENT: THE EMERGENCE OF HOLLYWOOD AGENTS 198 
(2010) (describing packaging deals in the classic studio era such as the package put together by 
agent Charles Feldman for the film MODEL WIFE (Universal 1941)).   
261. GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206. 
262. Id. at 205–06.   
263. Id. at 206; Drea, supra note 23, at 114. 
264. See CASPER, supra note 16, at 48. 
265. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206; Drea, supra note 23, at 115.  During the classic 
studio era, agent Charles Feldman received a special waiver from the Screen Actors Guild to pro-
duce.  See KEMPER, supra note 260.  Feldman’s production company functioned like an extension 
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waiver from the Screen Actors Guild,266 MCA started producing television 
shows in 1950 with its clients as stars.267  The creation of a production com-
pany grew out of Wasserman’s desire to earn more than the standard agency 
commission of ten percent,268 and the reality that actors needed work after 
the majors divested from their theaters.269   
In 2019, the WGA sought to eliminate packaging fees and to prohibit 
agencies from owning production companies.270  Since the 1950s, agencies 
have moved away from the standard ten-percent commission model and 
shifted to a packaging fee model which often includes profit-participation 
for the agency.271  Writers now complain that agents have prioritized their 
interests in packaging fees over their obligations to their writer-clients.272  
The WGA also asserts that tying a packaging fee to a show’s profits provides 
an incentive to reduce expenses, which include the amount paid to writers 
and other talent.273  As for the issue of agents acting as producers, the three 
largest agencies each have an agency-affiliated production company.274  The 
                                                          
of his agency and developed projects and package deals to be presented to the studios.  See id. at 
198. 
266. See Drea, supra note 23, at 116; see generally KEMPER, supra note 260, at 132–37. 
267. See Drea, supra note 23, at 115. 
268. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 206 (documenting revenues that the agency earned if a 
television series it produced went into syndication). 
269. See id. (explaining that SAG gave MCA a blanket waiver to allow it to move into 
production because “SAG members were happy for the work.”).  See also supra notes 248–249 
(describing how studio layoffs put many actors and craftsmen out of work). 
270. See Agency Campaign Timeline, supra note 237. 
271. See Answer and Counterclaims at 35, William Morris Endeavor Ent., LLC v. Writers 
Guild, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1127 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (No. 19-CV-05465); Drea, supra note 23, at 
124 (explaining that “[w]hen television programs or motion pictures are successful enough to gen-
erate meaningful back-end profits, a talent agency can earn more from package fees than it would 
under a traditional commission system.”). 
272. William Morris Answer and Counterclaims, supra note 271, at 5. 
273. See id. 
274. See Dave McNary, WME Urges Writer Clients to ‘Speak Up’ and Push WGA for 
‘Good Faith Negotiation’, VARIETY (Mar. 4, 2019, 11:58 AM), https://variety.com/2019/film/news
/wme-wga-good-faith-negotiation-1203154430/ [https://perma.cc/HL3D-EWKW]. 
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WGA objects to agency-affiliated production companies as a conflict of in-
terest with writers’ agents also acting as their bosses.275   
The recently resolved conflict between the WGA and the talent agen-
cies is thematically related to Davis and de Havilland’s legal battles because 
it is another example of the enduring struggle by artists to ensure they are 
treated fairly.  The conflict can also be viewed as a consequence of the shift 
in the balance of power to the agents caused by de Havilland’s victory to the 
agents.276  The WGA seeks to correct what it sees as an imbalance of power 
in its relationship with the agencies as that imbalance has manifested itself 
in the practices of packaging and agency-affiliated production.277   
VI. CONCLUSION 
One of the foremost labor issues in the entertainment industry today—
the dispute between the WGA and the ATA—is directly linked to the inno-
vations of agent Lew Wasserman.  But Wasserman would not have had his 
opportunity to lead agents to the apex of the film industry unless Olivia de 
Havilland had fought and won her case.278  Archival research shows that 
Bette Davis’s challenge, although a battle she ultimately lost, foreshadowed 
de Havilland’s victory.  She cornered a major studio into waiving its rights 
to suspension/extension, and new research shows she nearly compelled the 
studio to revise its standard long-term contract.  The practice of suspen-
sion/extension was an important component to the studio system, which gave 
the studios a means of controlling their stars even past the termination date 
                                                          
275. See David Robb, WGA Says 75% Of Projects At Agency-Affiliated Production Com-
panies Are Written By Agencies’ Own Clients, DEADLINE (May 15, 2019, 1:35 PM), https://dead-
line.com/2019/05/writers-guild-agency-affiliation-argument-hollywood-production-wga-
1202615758/ [https://perma.cc/TR33-VPR7] (reporting a discussion of members of the WGA ne-
gotiating committee about the conflict of interest that arises from having your fiduciary also be 
your employer).  See also Drea, supra note 23, at 120 (discussing the anti-trust case against MCA 
which resulted in MCA dissolving its talent agency and operating solely as a production company). 
276. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.  
277. As of February 5, 2021, the WGA reached a deal on a new franchise agreement with 
all agencies that addressed the WGA’s concerns about packaging and agency-affiliated production 
companies.  See Erik Hayden & Kim Masters, WME, Writers Guild Agree to Terms as Hollywood’s 
Bitter Feud Winds Down, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 5, 2021, 4:08 PM), https://www.holly-
woodreporter.com/news/sources-wme-writers-guild-agree-to-terms-as-hollywoods-bitter-feud-
winds-down/ [https://perma.cc/7VQP-Q42S]. 
278. See GOMERY, supra note 1, at 306 (“Wasserman got his opportunity with the de Havil-
land case of 1945.”). 
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of their contracts.  The practice could ruin an actor’s career, and openly chal-
lenging the studios could do likewise.279  It took the bravery of two women, 
who wanted artistic freedom and equal pay, to end the practice with finality.   
 
                                                          
279. See supra notes 47 and 48.  
